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This paper analyzes the effects of pension benefits, family conditions, and personal 
characteristics of the elderly on their labor supply, wages, hours of work and job 
satisfaction in the framework of the Nash bargaining that an old worker and a firm 
bargain over employment conditions such as wages, hours of work and job investment. 
It will be stressed that as workers become aged, they come to put more priority on hours 
of work, work circumstances, the contents of a job rather than wages, and make them 
improved by job investment in the form of lower wages. This paper also shows 
empirically, controlling the income effect of pensions, that the effects of the reduction 
scheme of the Employees’ Pension Plan on hours worked and labor participation of the 
elderly had disappeared by 2000.   
 

















     Most of older workers who are in their sixties are in the process of retiring from 
the labor markets. As their physical strength, memory and work incentives decline with 
ages, they would adjust their way of workings such as hours of work and work 
circumstances even if it is accompanied by a decrease in wages. At the same time, they 
have to prepare for their life after retirement. If they feel unsatisfied with the 
preparations, they would work for higher wages. This paper aims to analyze how wages, 
hours of work and job satisfaction of the elderly are determined, focusing on the effects 
of their pensions, family conditions, and personal  characteristics.        
Many previous studies1 have stressed that pensions suppress labor supply of the 
elderly not only because they have an income effect for leisure but because the 
Employees’ Pension Plan, which is widely applied to the employees who have worked in 
private companies, adopts the reduction scheme of pension to the recipients according to 
their hours of work, wage and the amount of pension. Controlling the income effect of 
pension benefits and endogeneity, this paper will test the effect of the reduction scheme 
through comparing with that of the pension program having no such scheme, for 
instance, the Governmental Mutual Aid. It will be also focused on how the effects of 
pensions differ between the early sixties and the latter, taking into consideration that 
the reduction scheme is different between them. 
        In order to make their way of workings more comfortable, the elderly try to improve 
work circumstances, the contents of job and the human relation in their work shop by 
bargaining with firms over the work circumstances and the job assignment, or in some 
cases they move among firms. The concept of job investment, which stands for the 
investment to promote job satisfaction of elderly workers, is important in this paper. 
More precisely, there are basically two ways to improve their job satisfaction. One way 
is to make them assigned to a job which is favorable in job characteristics. If the 
assignment is difficult within a firm, then they might move among firms for a favorable 
job. The other way is to improve work and circumstances by investing in equipments, 
tools or the work shop. Brightening shops more, using a robot for physically difficult 
work and slowing down work speed are good examples. The important thing is that both 
the ways are costly. That is, transfer to a more favorable job may decrease workers’ 
productivity and that the improvement of work circumstances requires capital 
investment. Therefore, the elderly and firms bargain over the job investment in 
                                                  
1  See Yamada(1990), Seike(1993), Tachibanaki and Shimono(1994), Seike and 
Shimada(1995), Seike et al.(1997), Ogawa(1998a, 1998b), Abe(1998), Mitani(2001) and 
Higuchi and Yamamoto(2002), for example.    3
addition to wages and hours of work and, as a result, possibly the former come to bear a 
part of its costs in the form of lower wages or longer hours of work. 
In consideration of these, this paper will analyze how pensions and family 
conditions of the elderly affect their job satisfaction on the factors such as work 
circumstances. Since more job investment is costly, it is expected that job satisfaction is 
closely related with wages and hours of work and, moreover, with pensions, personal 
characteristics and family conditions of the elderly.                   
          The analytical feature of this paper is to take a Nash bargaining approach. That is, 
it is assumed in this paper that an older worker and a firm bargain over wages, hours 
of work and the job investment. In turn, previous studies have usually relied on the 
traditional framework that an older person determines his labor supply, comparing his 
reservation wage with the market wage2. There are two main reasons why the Nash 
bargaining approach is taken in this paper. First, as the elderly become aged, not only 
their physical and mental strength but family conditions come to widely differ among 
them, that is, the factors affecting their disutility of work are quite different and likely 
to change every year, and, hence, they can not be treated uniformly. Thus their way of 
workings and economic conditions are needed to be changed individually and carefully 
through frequent renegotiations, particularly, for elderly workers reemployed after 
mandatory retirement. Second, in general there is a wide range of rent between a firm 
and an older worker possibly because he has worked for a long time at the current firm 
and accumulated firm-specific skills and because he has familiarity to the workplace 
and the job. It is also possible that the elderly settle down near the firm which they 
have  worked.      
     The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 overviews the present state on the 
old-age pensioners and presents the distributions of the elderly among the different 
pension plans and hours worked. Section 3 presents the Nash bargaining model to 
analyze the determinations of wages, hours of work and the job investment. Section 4 
explains the data and methodology used for estimations and tests the implications of 
the model, focusing on the effects of pensions, family conditions and personal 
characteristics of the elderly. In Section 5 the determinants of satisfactions concerning 
wages, hours worked and jobs of the elderly are discussed. Section 6 concludes the 
paper. 
                                                  
2  See Gordon and Blinder(1980) as a seminal work. Since their static model life cycle 
models of retirement behavior of the elderly have been developed, based on the dynamic 
programming method, by Gustman and Steinmeier(1986), Rust(1987) and Berkovec and 
Stern(1991). Stock and Wise(1990) formulated the option value model in a dynamic 
setting.  4
 
2. Present State on the Old-Age Pensioners 
To begin with, this section will review the present state on the utilization of 
different kinds of pensions. The Japanese public pensions are basically categorized by 
occupation into three, that is, the Employees’ Pension Plan (EPP), the National Pension 
Fund (NPF) and the Governmental Mutual Aid (GMA). In addition, there are private 
pension plans such as company pensions and individual. Concerning the public pension 
plans, which are supposed to widely cover the nation, it is important to note that they 
are different in the way how pensions are reduced when the elderly work. More 
specifically, the elderly who work under the application of the EPP have possibility that 
their pension benefits are reduced, depending on hours worked and earnings, while the 
ones under the GMA or the NPF have not entirely. Since the EPP covers most of the 
elderly who have worked as employees in private companies, it is often stressed that the 
Japanese pension system has a strong impact on labor supply of the elderly3. 
     It should be noted here that the EPP applies the Pension System of Reduction for 
Elderly Workers (ZAIROU) to the older employees whose ages are from 60 to 64 and 
who work more than 3/4 of the normal hours of work4. This implies that if older 
employees want to avoid the application to the ZAIROU, they work for a shorter hours 
and possibly earn less than those who work under the ZAIROU. If they work more than 
3/4 of the normal hours, their pension benefits will be reduced by 20 % or more, 
depending on their earnings, under the application to the ZAIROU. 
     Taking account of the above situation, let us check the data obtained from the 
Work Survey for the Elderly, which was conducted by Ministry of Health, Labor and 
Welfare (Japan) in 20005  for the elderly whose ages are from 55 to 69. Table 1 shows the 
composition of employed pensioners whose ages are in the early sixties and who worked 
as employees at the age of 55. It is interesting to find in Table 1 that the elderly who 
receive pension only from the EPP share most, that is, 40.1% of the 1,599 respondents 
while those only from the ZAIROU do 19.6%. This tendency does not change much even 
if those who receive pension from the other plans at the same time are included. This 
seems to imply that many older employees decrease hours of work to avoid the 
                                                  
3  See the works listed in footnote 1. 
4  Individual firms can determine the normal hours by themselves within the standard 
hours of work, i.e., 40 hours a week, which is regulated by the law. 
5  The survey was also conducted in 1980, 1983, 1988, 1992 and 1996. The reasons why 
this paper analyzes only the 2000 survey are that information concerning work 
satisfaction of elderly workers can not be obtained from the other surveys and that 
many previous studies have already analyzed them.    5
application to the ZAIROU. But we should not hasten to conclude because it is possible 
that they want to work for a shorter hours to make their way of working easier 
physically and mentally. The next section will deal with this problem. 
     Figure 1 shows the distribution of monthly hours worked by pension plan. As 
expected, the hours distribution of the older employees working under the ZAIROU lies 
higher than that of those under the EPP. More specifically, the average of monthly hours 
worked is 162.4 for employees under the ZAIROU and 114.0 for those under the EPP. It 
is interesting that the standard deviation of the former is 41.1, which is smaller than 
that of the latter, although the average of the former is larger. This implies that there 
exist many older employees who work for a long hours without applying to the ZAIROU. 
For example, 17.2% of the employees under the EPP work more than the regular 
standard hours per month, i.e., 160 hours. There can be two reasons why such older 
employees exist. First, it happens in the surveyed month that they work for a long hours 
although they usually do not. Second, they usually work for a long hours in fact, but do 
not report it to the Social Insurance Office to avoid the application to the ZAIROU. The 
problem is that the self-application system is basically taken for the EPP employees in 
determining the application to the ZAIROU6.   
     There is another evidence showing that the reduction scheme of the ZAIROU is 
often exaggerated too much. The survey conducted in 2000 asked if the elderly control 
hours and days of work in consideration of the reduction scheme of pension by the 
ZAIROU. Table 2 reports the results on the respondents, separating the elderly working 
under the EPP and those under the ZAIROU. Among the elderly working under the 
application to the ZAIROU, 76.5% answered as “I do not care it at all” while 23.5% as “I 
control hours and days of work”. In turn, 28% of the elderly under the EPP answered as 
“I do not care at all”, 25.9% as “I control hours and days of work” and 46.1% as “I do not 
work at all”. These results seem to indicate that the suppressing effect on labor supply 
of the reduction scheme of pension is large. It must be, however, cautious in interpreting 
the results obtained by the survey of this kind. For, according to the results from the 
other questions, many of the elderly who answered as “I do not work at all” actually 
searched for a job. That is, to the question of “why don’t you work?” 45.4% of them 
answered as “I can not get a job although I want to work”. Furthermore, to the question 
concerning the reason why they can not get a job, 68.6% of them replied “because I can 
not find a job suitable to me”. These results teach us that even if the elderly do not 
actually care much about the reduction scheme of pension, they are likely to exaggerate 
                                                  
6  According to hearing from a staff in the Social Insurance Office, they sometimes 
conduct a sample survey in the area over which they have jurisdiction.      6
its negative effect on their labor supply. Most workers do not like their income to be 
reduced. 
     It is also noteworthy that the present pension system has the effects to promote 
labor supply of the elderly. One is that if they postpone receiving pensions in spite of 
their qualifications, they can benefit later. It is said that the rate of return to the 
postponed amount of pension is around 8%, which is good higher than the interest rates 
currently prevailing in Japan. If the elderly postpone receiving pensions to get more 
benefits later and try to finance their living expenses by working during the period 
of .postponement, then pensions are regarded as being stimulative to labor supply of the 
elderly. Another effect is that in order to get qualification for receiving pensions, people 
have to pay premiums for a certain period. Therefore, some of the elder people who have 
not yet satisfied this qualification try to work. Thus the present pension system has 
some aspects encouraging labor supply of the elderly. 
  
3. A Bargaining Model 
Now assume that a worker and a firm match and bargain over the employment 
conditions. The bargaining is of the Nash type so that they share a rent due to 
firm-specific skills and/or familiarity to the workplace. Generally speaking, the elderly 
become weaker with age in their physical strength and memory, and is more likely to be 
forced to care for their spouse. Therefore, many of the elderly are employed as 
non-regular workers after mandatory retirement, and bargain with firms every years, 
adjusting to their changing physical and family conditions. It is assumed that if there is 
no rent between a worker and a firm, the bargaining breaks down and the worker or 
quits the labor market at least for a year7.  
For simplicity of analysis, it is assumed that the worker’s utility defined as  U is 
represented by a separable function, as follows, 
 
(1)     ) , ( ) , (
0 α c hD Y F W G F W U − + − + = , 
 
where  W is defined as the wage,  h  as hours of work,  F  as the full amount of the 
pension which he can receive,  ) , ( F W G   as the reduced amount of the pension, 
0 Y  as 
non-labor income, and  D  as the marginal disutility of hours of work expressed in the 
money term. The marginal disutility of hours of work is a function of the amount of job 
investment to improve his way of workings, c , and a shift parameter, α , in the 
                                                  
7  It is not denied that the worker will get a job in the next year by changes in economic 
conditions.  7
following way,  0 < c D  and  0 > α D , where the subscript implies differentiation. The 
sift parameter represents the factors such as age, sex, health, the pension and the 
number of other income earners in his family, which are supposed to affect the marginal 
disutility. This simplified specification makes it easier to analyze how each of the 
exogenous variables affects the determinations of the wage, hours of work and the job 
investment without serious loss of generality8. If the worker does not work, then it holds 
that  0 = W ,  0 = h ,  0 = c ,  0 = G  and  0 = D . It is also assumed that  0 ≥ W G  and 
0 ≥ F G .  
Let us define the worker’s marginal productivity as  p , which is measured by the 
maximum value which he can produce through working for an hour in the firm. It is 
possible that if he is transferred to a physically favorable job, he can not accomplish this 
maximum productivity, and then his productivity is  c ph − . It is also considered that a 
new job requires some training. This implies that the job investment includes not only 
the cost to improve the way of workings but also the reduced productivity by job 
transfer.  
The firm’s profit,  Π , is given by 
(2)     f R W c ph = − − = Π , 
where  f R   stands for the rent which the firm receives from employing the worker. Note 
here that the rent is equal to the profit. This is because, if the firm does not employ the 
worker, the profit is zero. In turn, taking into consideration that the worker can receive 
his full pension and  0 = h  if the negotiation breaks down, we define his rent,  w R , as 
follows, 
(3)     ) , ( ) , ( α c hD F W G W Rw − − = . 
Then, the Nash product is given by   
(4)  ] log[ ] log[ ) log( ) log( hD G W c W ph R R w f − − + − − = + . 
In the above specification it is assumed, for simplicity of analysis, that the bargaining 
powers are equal between them. 
                                                  
8  In particular the separable function assumed here can be criticized on the ground that 
the pension is assumed to affect the marginal disutility of hours of work while the wage 
is not. This criticism is natural as far as we focus only on the aspect that the worker 
uses them similarly for consumption. However, it can be considered that the worker 
feels security on the pension because he can obtain it even if he retires from the labor 
market. The income of the other family member can be interpreted as well.    8
The first-order conditions are given by differentiating (4) with respect to W ,  h  
and  c  in the following way9, 
 
(5)     0 ) 1 (
1 1












(7)      0
1 1
1 = − − hD
R R w f
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Rearranging the above system, we obtain 
 
(5)’     ] ) 1 )( [(
) 1 ( 1
1








(6)’     ) 1 ( w G p D − =  
 
(7)’     W c G hD − = − 1 . 
 
Under the current system of the Employees’ Pension Plan,  W G  and  F G  increase 
stepwise as  W increases. More specifically, if workers work for 3/4 of the regular hours 
or less, then  0 = W G and 0 = F G , that is, the pension is fully paid. If workers work for 
more than 3/4 of the regular hours and  F  is 22 or less, then  0 = W G  and  2 . 0 = F G  
in the range of  F W 8 . 0 22− < ,  2 / 1 = W G  and  6 . 0 = F G  in  34 8 . 0 22 ≤ ≤ − W F , and  
1 = W G  and  6 . 0 = F G  in  34 > W  unless  G F < . Note here that the unit is ten 
thousand yen and that in the case where  22 > F  the scheme is a little different from 
the above10.  
As is well known, the worker and the firm are likely to choose as a bargaining 
solution one of the kinked points on the pension scheme. However, this paper does not 
focus on the problem of which point they choose, but on how the scheme affects the wage, 
hours of work and the job investment for improving the working conditions, assuming 
that they have chosen one solution. That is, our aim is to know how these endogenous 
variables differ, depending on the level of  W G , where the worker decides to work, and 
                                                  
9  It is assumed here that the second-order conditions are satisfied. 
10  See Ohashi(2000) for the more precise formula of the present pension system.  9
on the level of  F , which he is qualified to receive11. 
In order to know the effects of  W G , we now conduct a comparative statics analysis 
on the system consisting of equations (5)’, (6)’ and (7)’. To begin with, differentiating (6)’ 
with  W G , we obtain   






where  0 < c D , as assumed before. Thus we can easily know that it is rational for the 
worker who works at a higher level of  W G  to invest more on the improvement of the 












This shows that the effect of  W G  on h  depends on  cc D . Although it is an empirical 
question how it is, let us assume that  cc D   is negligibly small, then the effect of  W G  on 
h  is negative. As for the effect of  W G  on W , differentiating (5) with  W G , we can 
obtain  















That is, an increase in  W G   has an effect to decrease  W   directly through changing the 
income share between the firm and the worker and indirectly through raising  c and 
decreasing  h . This result implies that the worker who work at the point of high  W G  
since he can receive a high wage due to his high productivity has an incentive to work 
for a short hours and to improve his working conditions even if he has to accept a lower 
wage relatively to his productivity. 
          The full amount of pension does not explicitly appear in the system, but can affect 
the bargaining solution thorough the effect on the disutility of labor. That is, since an 
increase in  F  can be considered to make the worker prefer reducing the disutility of 
labor more, it means an increase in the shift-parameter whose effects are assumed to be 
0 > α D  and  0 < α c D . We now analyze the effects of the shift-parameter by conducting 
a comparative statics analysis on the system. Differentiating (6)’ with  α , we obtain 







This implies that an increase in  F   accompanied with an increase in  α   raises the job 
investment. 
          Next, the differentiation of equation (7)’ with  α  gives  us  that 
                                                  
11  See Ohashi(2000) for the analysis on the Nash bargaining solutions.  10










+ − = . 
The effect of  α   on hours of work is ambiguous because  0 < α c D   is assumed here, that 
is, an increase in α  strengthens the decreasing effect of the job investment on the 
disutility while an increase in  c brought about by an increase in α  raises hours of 
work, as shown in the second term in the parenthesis. It is an empirical question which 
effect is dominating. The next section will show that the effect of pension on hours 
worked is negative and statistically significant at the ordinary level of confidence. If the 
effect of  α   on hours worked is negative, then it is decisively determined from equation 
(5)’ that an increase in  F  accompanied with an increase in α  decreases the wage 
through increasing the job investment and decreasing hours of work. 
          The number of income earner in the worker’s family, the non-labor income and the 
housing loan, which are used as explanatory variables in the empirical sections, also do 
not appear explicitly in the system, but they are assumed to affect the bargaining 
solution through α  as well as the pension. In turn, sex, age, tenure and health are 
assumed to affect labor productivity.     
          The social rent which is shared between the worker and the firm is defined as  R . 
If this social rent is negative, then the bargaining breaks down. Therefore,  R  must  be 
non-negative for the bargaining to reach an agreement, as follows, 
(8)      0 ) , ( ≥ − − = + = α c hD c ph R R R w f . 
If this relation does not hold, we can not observe employment relation12. That is, we can 
observe wages and hours worked only for the bargaining in which equation (8) holds. 
Thus this relation will be used to remove selection bias in the empirical analysis., 
 
4 Empirical Results on Wages, Hours worked and Labor Supply of the Elderly 
This section will analyze how wages, hours of work and labor supply of the elderly 
are determined, focusing on the effects of not only the ordinary factors, such as age, sex, 
health, education, tenure, industry and occupation, but also pension and family factors. 
The micro data used are from the Work Survey for the Elderly, which were conducted by 
Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (Japan) for the elderly whose ages are from 55 to 
69. Since the main aim of this paper is to analyze the effects of pension, it focuses on the 
                                                  
12  Note in equation (8) that  ) , ( F W G   does not appear. This is because it is effective 
only for the elderly who work more than 3/4 of the normal hours, that is, as far as the 
right-hand side in equation (8) is negative, it is difficult for the elderly to get a job in any 
level of hours of work.        11
elderly whose ages are 60 or more. The sample size is 12,752 in this stage, but the 
elderly who were not participating in the labor markets are dropped from the analysis. 
More precisely, we drop the elderly who did not work for the following reasons: “because 
I can not work physically”, “because I have family members who need care”, and 
“because I want to devote myself solely to enjoying my hobby or doing volunteer work”. 
This data restriction leads our sample size to 8,581. Furthermore, the elderly who were 
working as company executives or self-employed persons are dropped. This is because 
their positions are determined not only by their discretionary choices but also by the 
other uncontrollable factors such as company decisions, their own assets and family 
conditions, because their incomes are biased downward due to tax measures, and 
because hours worked are ambiguous and determined by their own. Thus the sample 
size is 5,172 in this stage. 
Since the aim of this paper is to analyze how elderly workers retire in the process 
of their aging, the elderly who did not worked at the age of 55 are deleted from our 
sample, regarded as they had not mainly been in the labor force. This leads the sample 
size to 5,125. It should be noted here that there are 232 elderly persons who did not 
worked at the age of 55, but they respond as they are “working usually” at the time of 
being surveyed13.  
     In the empirical analysis below two points should be noted. One is that wage and 
hours equations will be estimated in the reduced form. This is because the Nash 
bargaining model simultaneously determines wages, hours of work and the job 
investment, and gives us the reduced form equations for the dependent variables. The 
other is that, since the dependent variables are incidentally selected and observed only 
when the social rent is positive, the sample selection bias can be generated. Thus 
Heckman’s two-step estimation procedure will be used. In so doing, equation (8) with a 
random term added is used as a selection equation. The precise form of our estimation 
equation for wages is as follows, 
 
(9)        i i i u X W + = ' β , 
( 1 0 )       i i i v Y R + = ' α , 
( 1 1 )       otherwise W and R if W i i i 0 0 0 = ≥ > , 
where  ' β  and  ' α  are the row vectors of coefficients for the wage and the selection 
equations, respectively,  i X  and  i Y   are the column vectors of the independent 
                                                  
13  Since the number of these persons is relatively small, the inclusions of them did not 
change our results essentially.    12
variables, and  i u  and  i v   are the random terms which are assumed to have a bivariate 
normal distribution with  0 ) ( = i u E  and  0 ) ( = i v E . If the correlation between the two 
random terms is zero, there will be no sample selection bias. But it is theoretically 
expected that the correlation between two random terms is positive because the Nash 
bargaining determines the wage at a higher level as the social rent is larger. Thus we 
expect that the estimated coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio defined as lambda is 
positive. Similarly we can also estimate hours equations, but in this case it is 
ambiguous whether the correlation between the two random terms is positive or not. 
This is because the theoretical effect of the social rent on hours of work is not 
straightforward. 
     On estimating wage and hours equations, the data is separated into the elderly 
whose ages are between 60 and 64 and those between 65 and 69. Summary statistics on 
the variables used for analyzing two groups are reported in Table 3. Table 4 shows the 
estimated results of wage and hours equations for the early sixties, and Table 5 for the 
latter sixties. Each of the related selection equations are shown in the lower part of the 
tables. In the estimations of equation 1 in Table 4 and equation 4 in Table 5 the 
logarithm of wage whose data is the total amount of wages paid in September, 2000, 
including taxes, is used as the dependent variable, and in equations 6 and 7 in Table 6 
the logarithm of hourly wage rate is used as the dependent variable to make it easy to 
interpret the results of the bargaining. The data used for hours is the total hours 
worked in September (worked days  ×  hours worked per day). 
          Table 4 and 5 provide us some interesting findings. First, the effects on wages and 
hours worked of pension, which stands for the total amount of pension benefits14, are 
negative and statistically significant at the 5% level of confidence. These are consistent 
with those obtained by many previous studies such as Seike(1993), Tachibanaki and 
Shimono(1994) and Abe(1998). There can be three explanations for the negative effects. 
The first one is given by the traditional theory of labor supply. That is, if leisure is a 
normal good, an increase in the older worker’s pension raises his non-labor income and 
makes him prefer more leisure to wages and reduce hours of work. On defining this 
income effect, it is assumed in the traditional theory that the hourly wage rate is fixed. 
But equation 7 in Table 6 shows that the effect of pension on the wage rate for the early 
sixties is negative and statistically significant at the 10% level of confidence, and 
equation 8 that it is negative for the latter sixties although not significant. These 
                                                  
14  The total amount of pensions means the full amount which the elderly are qualified 
to receive. The 2000 Survey reports the reduced amount of the pension due to the 
application to the ZAIROU.  13
results are not inconsistent with the standard theory of labor supply if marginal 
productivity decreases with a decrease in hours of work. But, if marginal productivity 
remains constant or increases as hours worked decrease, the wage rate will not decrease 
in the framework of the standard theory. The second explanation is that, according to 
the bargaining model developed here, the elderly who found that his non-labor income 
was raised by an increase in the pension and decided to work in favor of more job 
investment would accept the wage rate to decrease. In the bargaining mode the wage 
rate can decrease as far as marginal productivity is not assumed to increase in a larger 
extent with a decrease in hours of work. Thus in the bargaining model which 
incorporates job investment the pension can have a negative effect on the wage rate. 
The third explanation which was stressed by previous studies focuses on the reduction 
scheme of pension, as explained in Section 2. It is an empirical question whether this 
explanation is effective or not, and will be discussed below.   
     Second, as shown in Table 4, the effect on wages and hours worked of the dummy 
variable, i.e., zairou_d, which represents whether each elder employee works under the 
application to the ZAIROU, is positive and statistically significant at the ordinary level 
of confidence. This implies that elder employees working under the application to the 
ZAIROU work for a longer hours and earn more than those who work without their 
pensions reduced. Note here that the dummy variable, s_EPP_d, showing the recipients 
of the EPP without reduction has a negative effect on hours worked which is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. These are not interesting because the pension 
system requires the elderly to work for a short hours if they want to avoid pension 
reductions. That is, the introduction of zairou_d as an explanatory variable is not 
appropriate since it is an endogenous variable in the determinations of wages and hours 
of work.   
In turn, it is interesting to know in Table 4 that the cross term, cross_pz, by 
zairou_d and pension, is not statistically significant at the 10% level of confidence in the 
hours equation and, moreover, its coefficient is positive. This means that the reduction 
scheme of the ZAIROU has no effect to reduce hours worked on the condition that the 
elderly accept to work under the application to the ZAIROU. But we should not hasten 
to conclude. The reason is that the application of the ZAIROU automatically reduces the 
pension by 20 percents regardless of the wage level, and hence elderly workers would 
decrease their hours worked to 3/4 of the standard hours. That is, the effect of the 
automatic reduction of pension still remains to be discussed.   
     In order to ascertain the effect of the 20% reduction of pension, we focus on the 
pension system of the Governmental Mutual Aid, which is applied to the elderly who  14
have worked as civil servants. The pension receivers under this system are exempt from 
any reduction even if they work at any level of hours worked and wage. Therefore, 
comparing the effects of the EPP and the GMA makes sense. In equation 3 the dummy 
variable showing the recipients of the GMA, GMA_d, is introduced as an explanatory 
variable with that of the EPP, EPP_d, which combines zairou_d and s_EEP_d to see the 
total effect of the EPP as a whole15. As shown in equation 3, the effect of GMA_d on 
hours worked is positive and significant at the 10% level of confidence while that of 
EPP_d is not significant. It is also interesting to know form the selection equation of 
equation 3 that the recipients of the GMA are more likely to participate in the labor 
markets. These imply that the elderly workers who are under the GMA work more than 
the other elderly. It can be guessed that since civil servants can find favorable jobs after 
mandatory retirement, they work more. It is noteworthy in equation 7 that the effects of 
zairou_d and s_EPP_d on hourly rates of wage are negative and statistically significant 
at the ordinary level of confidence while that of GMA is positive although it is not 
significant. In addition, many of the GMA recipients work at the governmental sectors 
where relatively high wages are paid. This is shown in the positive and large coefficient 
of public_scale, which is the dummy variable showing that the elderly work as civil 
servants. According to our data, 42% of the GMA recipients work as civil servants. But 
it is interesting that these effects seem to disappear in the latter sixties. See equation 8 
where the effect of GMA_d on hourly wages is negative and not significant at the 
ordinary level of confidence. At the same time its effect on labor supply also disappears 
as is shown by its selection equation.   
The reduction scheme of the EPP is also applied to the recipients whose ages are 
65-69, but less restrictive. More specifically, if 80% of the full pension plus earnings of 
the elderly under the EPP exceed 480 thousand yen, their pensions are reduced by half 
of the amount exceeded. Therefore, it is meaningful to compare the effects of the EPP 
between the early sixties ant the latter. Interestingly, the findings are against our 
expectation. That is, from equations 3 and 6 it is found that the effects of EPP_d on 
hours work and labor participation are positive for the early sixties while negative for 
                                                  
15  As is known form Table 1, there are some elderly parsons who receive pensions from 
both the EPP and the GMA. They are classified to either of the funds from which they 
receive more. The reference group consists mainly of the recipients from the NPF and 
the elderly who are not receiving pensions, including those having qualification. Seike 
and Shimada(1995) and Abe(1998) paid attention to the existence of those who are not 
receiving pensions although they have qualification because the number of them is not 
small. According to our data, among the early sixties who have qualification to the EPP, 
19% of them is not receiving pensions, and its 76% is working. In the reference group 
who is working they share 34%.  15
the latter sixties although both are not statistically significant at the ordinary level. If 
the reduction scheme is effective, the above relation should be reversed.   
Two points should be stressed here. One is that since EPP_d and GMA_d represent 
the feature of each pension system when the income effect is controlled by pension, their 
effects on wages and hours worked can be positive or negative a priori. The other is that 
the reduction scheme of the EPP does not work when hours worked are shorter. That is, 
it does not affect the decisions on labor participation of the elderly as far as the hours 
restrictions imposed by firms are less than 3/4 of the normal standard of hours.     
To sum up, we can not find any strong indication showing the suppressive effects 
of the reduction scheme of the EPP in the period of 2000. Abe(1998) found that the 
impact of the reduction scheme of the EPP was in the trend of decreasing form 1983 to 
1992. The findings in this paper are in line with it, and imply that the effect of the 
reduction scheme of the EPP had disappeared by 2000. A part of this trend is possibly 
due to the reforms of reduction scheme in the EPP16.         
     Third, it is often argued that pensions function as a subsidy to employment of the 
elderly, but its theoretical meaning is delicate17. In particular, this interpretation is 
difficult to understand how the subsidy is used by workers and/or firms. If it means a 
subsidy to firms paying wages, then pensions are supposed to have a positive effect on 
elderly employment18. But, pensions have a negative effect not only on the hourly wages 
of the elderly but also on their labor supply, as shown in Tables 4, 5 and 6. The 
bargaining model in this paper does not regard pensions as a subsidy, but simply a kind 
of non-labor income which makes the elderly prefer to more leisure and job investment. 
Note here that pensions have no effect to increase the social rent in equation (8) and, 
hence, to promote elderly employment. Thus our bargaining model can rationalize the 
negative effects of pensions on both labor supply and the hourly wages of the elderly.       
     Forth, Tables 4 and 5 show that the number of the income earners other than the 
elderly in their family, n_earn, plays an important role for the elderly in determining 
their labor supply. More specifically, it has a negative effect on wages and labor market 
participation, and their effects are statistically significant at the ordinary level of 
confidence. But the effect of n_earn on hours worked can not be ascertained statistically 
for both the early sixties and the latter. It is easily guessed that more income earners 
                                                  
16  The reduction scheme of the EPP was reformed in 1986、1989 and 1994, so as to 
mitigate the suppressive effect on labor supply of the elderly.   
17  See Tachibanaki and Shimono(1994), Ogawa(1998b)and Mitani(2001), for example.   
18  One of the reasons why they propose the subsidy hypothesis is that in the estimated 
equations of hours worked or labor supply zirou_d    has a positive effect. But, as 
discussed above, zairou_d is endogenous.  16
decrease the economic need for the elderly to work and necessitates someone to devote 
solely to housework or at least not to need extra care. But it seems that n_earn has some 
effects which are different from the income effect of pensions. For example, a wife can 
easily obtain understanding of work from her working husband19. It is also interesting 
to find from Table 6 that the effect of n_earn on the hourly wage is negative and 
statistically significant at the 5% level for the early sixties. This can be interpreted as 
indicating that the elderly with other income earners invest in j o b s  t o  r a i s e  j o b  
satisfaction in the same way as pensions.   
     Fifth, as for the wage equations estimated by the Heckman’s two-step estimation 
procedure in Tables 4, 5 and 6, the inverse Mills ratio defined as lambda is positive and 
statistically significant at the ordinary level of confidence for both the early and the 
latter sixties. This implies that the random term of the wage function is positively 
correlated with that of the selection equation because the wage level and the hourly 
wage are likely to be higher as the social rent is larger, as expected theoretically. In turn, 
lambda in the hours equations are positive but not statistically significant. Accordingly, 
it can be said that the selection bias is serious in the estimations of the wage functions 
while not in the hours equations. 
          Sixth, Tables 4 and 5 show that the experience of mandatory retirement, m_retire, 
has negative effects on wages, hours worked and labor supply of the elderly, among 
which those on wages and labor supply are statistically significant at the ordinary level 
of confidence. According to Table 6, it also decreases hourly wages, implying that its 
effect on hours worked is weaker than that on wages. In turn, as shown in Table 4 and 5, 
the dummy variable, same_j, which represents whether elderly employees work at the 
same occupation as their ages are 55, has positive effects on wages, and they are 
statistically significant at the 10% level. It is interesting that its effect on hours worked 
is positive for the early sixties while negative for the latter sixties. This may lead to the 
result that the positive effect of same_j  on hourly wages of the latter sixties is 
statistically significant while that on the early sixties is not. That is, the early sixties 
who work at the same occupation as before earn more by working for a long hours and 
the latter sixties by high hourly rates. 
     Finally, workers’ physical and economic conditions, which are shown by the 
dummy variables, i.e., b_health (taking 1 for the elderly in bad health and 0 otherwise), 
and h_loan (taking 1 for the elderly paying a house loan and 0 otherwise) have the 
expected effects on wages, hours worked and labor supply of the elderly which are 
                                                  
19  See Chuma(1991) for joint retirement decision of old couples in Japan.  17
consistent with the results of previous studies such as Seike(1993) and Higuchi and 
yamamoto(2002). In turn, the effects of edu_cost  (taking 1 for the elderly bearing 
educational costs and 0 otherwise) are not clear except for the positive effect on wages. 
This seems to imply that the elderly do not play an important role to earn for 
educational costs in their family.   
 
5  Determinants of Job Satisfaction 
  Work satisfaction of elderly employees depends on many factors such as the contents 
of a jobs, work circumstances, the human relation in their shop flour and the economic 
conditions, in addition to wages and hours of work. It is quite possible that as they 
become aged, they prefer short hours of work, jobs worth doing, good work 
circumstances and favorable human relations more, that is, job satisfaction becomes 
more important than wages for elderly employees. Among the factors affecting job 
satisfaction the determinants of hours of work were analyzed in the former section 
because hours of work are observable and explicitly related to the social rent and the 
wage in the model. In turn, the other factors such as the contents of a job, which can be 
improved by the job investment, are unobservable. Furthermore, job investment is also 
unobservable. Therefore, to test the implications of the model we will focus on job 
satisfaction which job investment affects. 
     The survey used in this paper asked to elderly employees how they are satisfied 
with work circumstances, the human relation in their work shop, the use of their ability 
and knowledge, work worth doing, hours of work and the wage level of their current job. 
They answered one out of the four choices; “very satisfied”, “somewhat satisfied”, “not 
too satisfied” and “not at all satisfied”. Using the answers on these questions, this 
section will analyze the determinants of each satisfaction. 
Table 7-1 and 7-2 indicate the results estimated by ordered probit models on 
satisfactions. The interesting findings can be summarized in the following way. First, 
the effect of the total amount of pensions on work satisfaction is positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level of confidence except for satisfactions on wages 
and the use of ability and experience. These results are consistent with the implications 
of the bargaining model developed in this paper. That is, the elderly who receive higher 
pensions can obtain more job satisfaction by scarifying wages. They search for a more 
satisfying job and good human relation, or d e m a n d  f i r m s  t o  i n v e s t  m o r e  i n  t h e i r  
workplaces in compensation for lower wages. Based on equation 13, it is also possible 
that since they are not fully using their ability and experience on the current job, their 
wages  are  lower.          18
     Second, according to Tables 7-1 and 7-2 the number of the income earners other 
than the elderly respondent plays an important effect on work satisfaction similarly to 
those of the pension. That is, it has generally a positive effect on work satisfaction 
although the positive effects on the human relation and the use of ability and 
experience are not statistically ascertained. In particular, it is interesting that the effect 
of n_earn on wage satisfaction is large and statistically significant at the 5% level of 
confidence while pension is not. This seems to imply that the elderly who live with more 
income earners have a higher acceptance level of wage to work and afford to search for a 
better job than those receiving high pensions, as far as they decide to participate in the 
labor market. 
     Third,  Tables  7-1  and  7-2 indicate that the effects of the dummy variable showing 
the elderly employees who receive pensions form the EPP are generally negative and 
statistically significant at the 10% level of confidence on work satisfaction except on 
hours worked. One of the reasons is that in general the EPP pensioners receive lower 
pensions than the other. More specifically, from our data, the average amount of 
pensions of the EEP pensioners employed, including the ZAIROU, is about 146 
thousand yen per month while the GMA pensioners is 219 thousand yen. A part of the 
effect of this difference seems to be captured by EPP_d although the amount of pension 
is controlled in the estimations. Another reason is that the EPP pensioners earn lower 
hourly wages than the other elder employees including non_pensioners, as was shown 
in Table 6. These factors make the EPP pensioners not only unsatisfied with wages but 
less invested in their jobs.   
     Forth, the need to pay house loan has negative effects on work satisfaction. 
Specifically, the effects on satisfaction concerning wages, hours of work and 
circumstances are statistically significant at the 5% level of confidence while those 
concerning the human relation, the use of ability and experience and work worth doing 
are not significant. As was shown in Tables 4 or 5, the elderly who have to pay house 
loan are more likely to participate in the labor markets and to work for a longer hours. 
It is possible that they are urged to earn more in order to pay house loan, and work even 
for a longer hours and in unfavorable circumstances. These make them feel 
dissatisfactions on wages, hours of work and circumstances. As for the effects of the 
educational costs we can expect that they are the same as those of house loan, but the 
obtained results are vague. This is probably due to that the role of the elderly whose 
ages are more than 60 is only to supplement the educational costs for grown-up or 
grandchildren and hence the need to earn more for educational costs seems to be not 
strong for them.  19
          Fifth, as was indicated in Tables 4 or 5, the elderly who have a health problem are 
more likely to retire from the labor markets. Unfortunately, if they have to work for 
some reasons such as economic motives, their choice on work conditions must be quite 
limited and, accordingly, their work satisfaction becomes lower. Tables 7-1 and 7-2 show 
that the effects of b_health on work satisfaction are widely negative and statistically 
significant at the 5% level of confidence except for satisfaction on hours worked. 
 
 
6  Conclusions 
        This paper attempted to analyze the effects of pension benefits, family conditions, 
and personal characteristics of the elderly on their labor supply, wages, hours of work 
and work satisfaction in the framework that the elderly and firms bargain over 
employment conditions including job investments. It was stressed in the analysis that 
as workers become aged, they come to put more priority on hours of work, work 
circumstances, the human relation in the workshop and the contents of a job rather 
than on wages, as far as their economic constraint allows. The main results obtained in 
this paper can be summarized as follows. 
(1)  It was shown that pensions and income earners other than the elderly in their 
family have an income effect not only to make hours of work shorter but to increase job 
investment for obtaining higher satisfaction on job characteristics. Evidence that 
pensions and other income earners have an effect to decrease hourly rates of wages can 
be interpreted as indicating that more job investment is bargained.     
(2) Many previous studies have explained the suppressive effect of public pensions on 
labor supply, based on the reduction scheme of the Employees’ Pension Plan, that is, the 
ZAIROU. However, as far as the elderly work under the application to the ZAIROU, not 
only their hours worked are longer than those of the recipients of the other pensions, 
but also the suppressive effect of the reduction scheme on hours worked can not be 
ascertained statistically. The ZAIROU is supposed to be applied if the elderly whose 
ages are from 60 to 64 work more than 3/4 of the normal hours. Therefore, there is a 
possibility that the elderly avoid the application to it by reducing hours worked. To 
ascertain this possibility the paper compared the suppressive effects of the EEP for the 
early and the latter sixties since the reduction scheme is less restrictive in the latter. In 
addition, it also focused on the effects of the Governmental Mutual Aid which do not 
reduce pensions at all even if its recipients work. Our results did not show any 
indication that the reduction scheme of the EEP is suppressive to labor supply of the 
elderly. That is, it seems that the suppressive effect of the reduction scheme had  20
disappeared by 2000. 
(3) There is an interpretation that pensions work as a subsidy to employment. If this 
interpretation is correct, pensions should increase labor supply of the elderly and hence 
employment. But it was shown in this paper that pensions have a negative effect on 
labor supply while they decrease hourly wage rates. Pensions can be interpreted as a 
“subsidy” to the elderly to increase job satisfaction as well as the number of the income 
earners other than the elderly.   
(4) The elderly who pay house loan work for a longer hours and earn more, but generally 
they are dissatisfied with wages, hours worked and job characteristics. It is also found 
that the elderly who have a health problem work at a lower wage and for a shorter 
hours while their work satisfaction is lower. These imply that those who are forced to 
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          unit: number（％）
Type of Pension Employees' P.P ZAIROU National P. F. Mutual Aid P. Company P.P. Private P.P. Total (100%)
Employees' P.P.   654 (40.1%) 0 0     27 (1.7%)     80 (5.0%)     13 (0.8%) 774 (48.1%)
ZAIROU    315 (19.6%) 0      10 (0.6%)      51 (3.2%)        4 (0.2%)  380 (23.6%)
National P. Fund      55 (3.4%) 0 0        1 (0.0%)    56  (3.5%)
Mutual Aid P.     206(12.8%)        6 (0.4%)        1 (0.0%)    213 (13,2%)
Company P.P.     152 (9.5%)        8 (0.5%)   160 10.0%)
Private P.P.      25 (1.6%)     25 (1.6%)
Note 1: Each of the diagonal elements of the table shows the number(%) of pensioners receiving benefits onlty from the one coresponding plan and  
     the nondiagonal elements those receiving from the two plans.
Note 2: Emploees' Pension Plan includes plans for the injuried and the survivors, and Incumbent Pension Plan for those who postphone to receive benefits.
　　 National Pension Fund excludes the pensioners receiving benefits from the other plans. Company Pension Plan stands for pension plans idiosyncratic 
　　  to companies, including retirement pensions.  Workmen's compensations are included in Private Pension Plan.
　　 The total number of the employed respondents of early sixties is 1,599, but there are 9 elders who receive benefits from three different types of    
      pensions among them. They are double counted in this cross table..                   Table 2 Suppresive Effects of the Reduction Scheme 
                                on Labor Supply of the Early Sixties
　　　unit: number (%)
               Answer   ZAIROU recepients     EPP recepients
I do not care it at all              186(76.5%)                183(28%)
I control hours and days of work                57(23.5%)              169(25.9%)
I do not work at all              301(46.1%)                  Table3  Summary Statistics
Observation          The early sixties            The latter sixties
Variable   Mean    Std. dev   Min.    Max.    Mean   Std. dev     Min.     Max.
wage   16.06      15.19 0 166     10.88     11.71 0 125
hours 138.58      56.44 2 312     118.8     59.93 2 300
sex   0.621      0.485 0 1     0.678     0.467 0 1
age   61.92      1.420 60 64     66.80     1.401 65 69
tenure   14.77      13.89 0 49     13.73     14.06 0 53
school_u   0.112      0.315 0 1     0.134     0.341 0 1
school_j   0.422      0.494 0 1     0.468     0.499 0 1
b_health   0.196      0.397 0 1     0.232     0.422 0 1
m_retire   0.517      0.499 0 1     0.620     0.485 0 1
prof   0.013      0.117 0 1     0.009     0.095 0 1
manage   0.019      0.137 0 1     0.035     0.184 0 1
office   0.008      0.093 0 1     0.004     0.067 0 1
sale   0.021      0.143 0 1     0.021     0.146 0 1
service   0.009      0.094 0 1     0.009     0.095 0 1
maint   0.039      0.195 0 1     0.028     0.166 0 1
trans   0.053      0.225 0 1     0.038     0.191 0 1
commu   0.084      0.278 0 1     0.062     0.242 0 1
dig   0.019      0.139 0 1     0.026     0.160 0 1
agri   0.085      0.279 0 1     0.057     0.233 0 1
l_scale   0.065      0.247 0 1     0.029     0.170 0 1
g_scale   0.058      0.235 0 1     0.044     0.206 0 1
m_scale   0.133      0.340 0 1     0.098     0.297 0 1
h_loan   0.193      0.395 0 1     0.153     0.361 0 1
edu_cost   0.077      0.267 0 1     0.076     0.266 0 1
zairou_d   0.102      0.302 0 1
kyou_d   0.096      0.295 0 1     0.144     0.351 0 1
pension   10.16      10.30 0 54     15.81     9.289 0 59
n_earn   1.318      0.940 0 5     1.384     0.974 0 5
zairou_d   0.102      0.303 0 1
s_EPP_d   0.452      0.498
EPP_d   0.530      0.499 0 1     0.622     0.627 0 1
GMA_d   0.095      0.294 0 1     0.132     0.338 0 1
Note1: The units of wage and pension are ten thousand yen, and those of tenure . 
     and age are years.
Note2: The definitions of the variables which are not explained in the text are the 
    following. school_u is the dummy variable taking 1for university graduates and
    the like, and school_j for junior high school graduates and the like, respectively. 
    prof, manage, office, sale, service, maint, trans, commu, dig and agri are the. 
    dummy variables representing occupations of old workers. Professional and  
    technical work is abbreviated as prof, managerial as manage, security related as  
    maint, transportation related as trans, communication as commu, mining as dig 
    and agricultural as agri. The reference occupation is manufacturing work.
    l_scale and m_scale are the dummy variables showing the size of the private   
    company at which each old worker is emplyed. L_scale represents the companies 
    which employ more than 1,000 employees and m_scale the ones employing   
    between 300 and 999 employees. g_scale shows governmental officers including .
    local. The reference group is the old workers who are employed at the 
    small-scaled companies with employees less than 299.Table 4
Determinants of Wages and Hours of Work of the Early Sixtes
equation                equation 1 equation 2 equation 3
depend. va.                  ln_wage  ln_hours   ln_hours
Coef. Std. Err. P-value Coef. Std. Err. P-value Coef. Std. Err. P-value
sex 0.765 0.071 0.00 0.289 0.054 0.00 0.298 0.057 0.00
age -0.019 0.014 0.17 -0.004 0.010 0.66 -0.010 0.010 0.33
tenure 0.011 0.001 0.00 0.004 0.001 0.00 0.006 0.001 0.00
b_health -0.312 0.101 0.00 -0.213 0.078 0.01 -0.226 0.079 0.00
school_u 0.204 0.069 0.00 -0.117 0.050 0.02 -0.111 0.050 0.03
school_j -0.068 0.045 0.13 0.036 0.033 0.27 0.031 0.033 0.35
m_retire -0.288 0.096 0.00 -0.077 0.075 0.30 -0.096 0.076 0.21
same_j 0.096 0.043 0.02 0.060 0.038 0.11 0.091 0.039 0.02
prof 0.343 0.110 0.00 0.128 0.091 0.16 0.080 0.093 0.39
manage 0.410 0.129 0.00 -0.029 0.110 0.79 -0.044 0.114 0.70
office 0.199 0.129 0.13 -0.456 0.112 0.00 -0.456 0.116 0.00
sale 0.158 0.099 0.11 -0.195 0.086 0.02 -0.251 0.089 0.01
service 0.002 0.133 0.99 -0.047 0.117 0.69 -0.023 0.120 0.85
maint 0.404 0.070 0.00 0.136 0.060 0.02 0.149 0.062 0.02
trans 0.184 0.077 0.02 0.039 0.066 0.56 0.039 0.068 0.57
commu 0.063 0.061 0.30 0.054 0.053 0.31 0.052 0.055 0.35
dig 0.110 0.095 0.25 0.128 0.084 0.13 0.142 0.086 0.10
agri 0.239 0.055 0.00 0.034 0.048 0.48 0.033 0.050 0.51
public_scale 0.193 0.126 0.13 0.045 0.112 0.68 -0.054 0.116 0.64
l_scale 0.153 0.056 0.01 0.064 0.049 0.19 0.027 0.050 0.59
m_scale 0.147 0.042 0.00 0.049 0.036 0.17 0.061 0.037 0.10
h_loan 0.283 0.073 0.00 0.100 0.055 0.07 0.096 0.058 0.10
edu_cost 0.143 0.075 0.06 0.087 0.053 0.10 0.086 0.053 0.11
n_earn -0.219 0.079 0.01 -0.065 0.062 0.30 -0.066 0.062 0.29
pension -0.023 0.005 0.00 -0.015 0.004 0.00 -0.013 0.005 0.00
zairou_d 0.194 0.051 0.00 0.230 0.073 0.00
cross_pz 0.005 0.004 0.23
s_EPP_d -0.250 0.041 0.00 -0.122 0.036 0.00
EPP_d 0.034 0.043 0.43
GMA_d 0.183 0.100 0.07
_cons 3.103 0.873 0.00 4.899 0.621 0.00 5.181 0.642 0.00
selection 
sex 0.314 0.064 0.00 0.329 0.065 0.00
age -0.004 0.020 0.85 -0.005 0.020 0.79
school_u 0.121 0.090 0.18 0.054 0.092 0.56
school_j -0.020 0.059 0.73 0.002 0.060 0.97
b_health -0.473 0.068 0.00          same as equation 1 -0.469 0.068 0.00
m_retire -0.497 0.059 0.00 -0.501 0.059 0.00
h_loan 0.326 0.075 0.00 0.351 0.076 0.00
edu_cost 0.098 0.105 0.35 0.065 0.106 0.54
pension -0.021 0.003 0.00 -0.026 0.004 0.00
n_earn -0.413 0.029 0.00 -0.408 0.030 0.00
EPP_d 0.028 0.082 0.73
GMA_d 0.485 0.125 0.00
_cons 1.432 1.205 0.24 1.500 1.219 0.22
lambda 0.857 0.345 0.01 0.195 0.280 0.49 0.203 0.281 0.47
Wald chi2  1198.42 749.40 650.88
 Number of obs = 2544, Censored obs. = 987, Uncensored obs> = 1557
Note: Although the estimated results are not reported in the table for saving space, industry dummies 
        are used in estmating wage and hours equattions but seclection.        Table 5
                   Determinats of Wages and Hours of Work of the Latter Sixties
equation                 equation 4               equation 5               equation 6
depend. va.   ln_wage  ln_hours   ln_hours
Coef. Std. Err. P-value Coef. Std. Err. P-value Coef. Std. Err. P-value
sex 0.856 0.121 0.00 0.364 0.089 0.00 0.364 0.089 0.00
age -0.031 0.026 0.23 -0.023 0.019 0.23 -0.023 0.018 0.21
tenure 0.013 0.002 0.00 0.010 0.002 0.00 0.010 0.002 0.00
b_health -0.490 0.197 0.01 -0.225 0.148 0.13 -0.215 0.147 0.15
school_u 0.290 0.115 0.01 0.055 0.086 0.52 0.053 0.085 0.53
school_j 0.113 0.120 0.35 0.069 0.088 0.43 0.063 0.088 0.48
m_retire -0.282 0.106 0.01 -0.123 0.079 0.12 -0.125 0.078 0.11
same_j 0.132 0.067 0.05 -0.009 0.057 0.87 -0.006 0.057 0.92
prof 0.510 0.198 0.01 0.164 0.168 0.33 0.156 0.168 0.35
manage 0.703 0.157 0.00 0.279 0.138 0.04 0.272 0.139 0.05
office 0.262 0.249 0.29 0.000 0.219 1.00 -0.014 0.219 0.95
sale 0.329 0.154 0.03 -0.664 0.130 0.00 -0.677 0.131 0.00
service -0.391 0.207 0.06 -1.079 0.179 0.00 -1.075 0.179 0.00
maint 0.480 0.122 0.00 0.248 0.105 0.02 0.245 0.105 0.02
trans 0.108 0.134 0.42 0.215 0.113 0.06 0.207 0.113 0.07
commu 0.069 0.103 0.50 0.135 0.087 0.12 0.135 0.087 0.12
dig 0.306 0.137 0.03 0.259 0.116 0.03 0.256 0.116 0.03
agri 0.399 0.098 0.00 0.116 0.083 0.16 0.104 0.084 0.22
public_scal -0.500 0.200 0.01 -0.425 0.167 0.01 -0.441 0.168 0.01
l_scale 0.029 0.121 0.81 0.098 0.103 0.34 0.096 0.103 0.35
m_scale 0.078 0.073 0.28 0.050 0.062 0.41 0.056 0.062 0.37
h_loan 0.345 0.177 0.05 0.268 0.130 0.04 0.259 0.129 0.05
edu_cost 0.267 0.160 0.10 0.139 0.115 0.23 0.137 0.114 0.23
n_earn -0.317 0.169 0.06 -0.159 0.126 0.21 -0.152 0.126 0.23
pension -0.020 0.009 0.03 -0.014 0.007 0.04 -0.015 0.007 0.03
EPP_d -0.122 0.062 0.05 -0.117 0.046 0.01 -0.072 0.068 0.29
GMA_d 0.123 0.134 0.36
_cons 3.472 1.756 0.05 5.895 1.281 0.00 5.946 1.271 0.00
select
sex 0.273 0.083 0.00
age 0.024 0.024 0.31
school_u -0.003 0.106 0.98
school_j 0.274 0.076 0.00
b_health -0.525 0.079 0.00
m_retire -0.223 0.074 0.00         same as equation 4         same as equation 4
h_loan 0.507 0.097 0.00
edu_cost 0.308 0.139 0.03
pension -0.025 0.005 0.00
n_earn -0.485 0.036 0.00
EPP_d -0.102 0.092 0.27
GMA_d -0.056 0.180 0.76
_cons -0.615 1.576 0.70
lambda 1.125 0.571 0.05 0.533 0.434 0.22 0.505 0.432 0.24
Wald chi2 569.75 518.13
Number of obs = 1665, Censored obs = 856, Uncensored obs. = 809
Note: see the note in Table 4.                  Table 6
   Determinats of Hourly Wage Rates 
equation                 equation 7                  equation 8
object                early sixties                 latter sixties
Coef. Std. Err. P-value| Coef. Std. Err. P-value
sex 0.461 0.059 0.00 0.492 0.075 0.00
age -0.014 0.011 0.22 -0.008 0.016 0.60
tenure 0.006 0.001 0.00 0.003 0.002 0.08
b_health -0.074 0.080 0.36 -0.268 0.123 0.03
school_u 0.296 0.054 0.00 0.236 0.072 0.00
school_j -0.097 0.036 0.01 0.045 0.074 0.54
m_retire -0.182 0.078 0.02 -0.158 0.066 0.02
same_j 0.034 0.037 0.36 0.141 0.045 0.00
prof 0.222 0.093 0.02 0.348 0.131 0.01
manage 0.447 0.111 0.00 0.426 0.106 0.00
office 0.652 0.112 0.00 0.266 0.168 0.11
sale 0.367 0.086 0.00 0.997 0.102 0.00
service 0.052 0.115 0.65 0.687 0.138 0.00
maint 0.264 0.060 0.00 0.233 0.081 0.00
trans 0.148 0.066 0.02 -0.104 0.089 0.24
commu 0.004 0.053 0.95 -0.065 0.068 0.34
dig -0.016 0.083 0.84 0.048 0.091 0.60
agri 0.207 0.047 0.00 0.286 0.065 0.00
public_scale 0.140 0.058 0.02 -0.071 0.132 0.59
l_scale 0.091 0.048 0.06 -0.068 0.080 0.39
m_scale 0.096 0.036 0.01 0.026 0.048 0.59
h_loan 0.173 0.061 0.00 0.080 0.110 0.47
edu_cost 0.050 0.059 0.40 0.129 0.098 0.19
n_earn -0.131 0.063 0.04 -0.160 0.106 0.13
pension -0.008 0.005 0.07 -0.006 0.006 0.32
zairou_d -0.122 0.053 0.02
s_EPP_d -0.133 0.044 0.00
EEP_d -0.018 0.059 0.76
GMA_d 0.071 0.099 0.47 -0.035 0.115 0.76
_cons -1.840 0.696 0.01 -2.438 1.084 0.03
select
sex 0.329 0.065 0.00 0.273 0.083 0.00
age -0.005 0.020 0.79 0.024 0.024 0.31
school_u 0.054 0.092 0.56 -0.003 0.106 0.98
school_j 0.002 0.060 0.97 0.274 0.076 0.00
b_health -0.469 0.068 0.00 -0.525 0.079 0.00
m_retire -0.501 0.059 0.00 -0.223 0.074 0.00
h_loan 0.351 0.076 0.00 0.507 0.097 0.00
edu_cost 0.065 0.106 0.54 0.308 0.139 0.03
pension -0.026 0.004 0.00 -0.025 0.005 0.00
n_earn -0.408 0.030 0.00 -0.485 0.036 0.00
EEP_d 0.028 0.082 0.73 -0.102 0.092 0.27
MGA_d 0.485 0.125 0.00 -0.056 0.180 0.76
_cons 1.500 1.219 0.22 -0.615 1.576 0.70
lambda 0.559 0.280 0.04 0.600 0.359 0.09
Wald chi2 966.3 705.61
Number of obs = 2544 Nm. of obs = 1665
Censored obs = 987 Cencored obs = 856
Uncensored obs = 1557 Uncensored obs. = 809
Note: see the note in Table 4.Table 7-1 Analysis of Work Satisfaction - Ordered Probit Models -
equation              equation 9            equation 10             equation 11
depnd. va.          satis. on wages    satis. on hours worked       satis. on circumstances
Coef. Std. Err. P-value Coef. Std. Err. P-value Coef. Std. Err. P-value
sex -0.104 0.060 0.08 -0.124 0.064 0.05 -0.152 0.064 0.02
age 0.034 0.009 0.00 0.001 0.010 0.91 0.000 0.010 0.99
tenure 0.001 0.002 0.66 0.002 0.002 0.32 0.003 0.002 0.15
b_health -0.135 0.062 0.03 -0.104 0.065 0.11 -0.248 0.064 0.00
school_j 0.103 0.078 0.19 0.019 0.082 0.82 0.071 0.081 0.38
school_u 0.063 0.053 0.24 0.060 0.056 0.28 -0.010 0.055 0.85
m_retire -0.044 0.053 0.41 0.005 0.056 0.92 -0.037 0.055 0.51
same_j -0.026 0.060 0.67 -0.005 0.063 0.94 -0.092 0.063 0.14
prof 0.173 0.154 0.26 0.096 0.163 0.55 0.261 0.162 0.11
manage 0.418 0.162 0.01 0.193 0.169 0.25 0.374 0.167 0.03
office 0.406 0.195 0.04 0.532 0.208 0.01 0.437 0.203 0.03
sale 0.535 0.137 0.00 0.195 0.145 0.18 0.358 0.143 0.01
service 0.053 0.187 0.78 0.362 0.196 0.06 0.333 0.196 0.09
maint 0.372 0.100 0.00 0.147 0.106 0.17 0.411 0.105 0.00
trans 0.168 0.110 0.13 0.074 0.116 0.52 0.091 0.116 0.43
commu -0.095 0.087 0.27 -0.119 0.091 0.19 -0.088 0.091 0.33
dig -0.209 0.128 0.10 -0.347 0.134 0.01 0.175 0.133 0.19
g_scale 0.106 0.085 0.21 0.136 0.090 0.13 0.160 0.089 0.07
m_scale 0.030 0.060 0.61 0.039 0.063 0.54 0.058 0.063 0.36
h_loan -0.106 0.057 0.06 -0.131 0.060 0.03 -0.129 0.059 0.03
edu_cost -0.059 0.083 0.47 0.086 0.087 0.32 -0.114 0.085 0.18
n_earn 0.062 0.027 0.02 0.113 0.028 0.00 0.046 0.028 0.10
pension 0.004 0.003 0.20 0.011 0.003 0.00 0.014 0.003 0.00
EPP_d -0.104 0.055 0.06 -0.016 0.058 0.78 -0.111 0.058 0.05
cross_zai -0.150 0.081 0.07 -0.005 0.086 0.95 -0.154 0.085 0.07
Num. of obs 2367 2360 2352
Log Likelihood -3029 -2468 2567
Pseudo R2 0.021 0.020 0.032
Note: Industry dummies are used for estimations, but most of them are not statistically significant at the
        10% level of confidence.    Table 7-2 Analysis of Work Satisfaction - Ordered Probit Models -
equation                  equation 12                equation 13             equation 14
depnd. va.      satis. on human relation      satis. on use of exp.       satis. on worth doing
Coef. Std. Err. P-value Coef. Std. Err. P-value Coef. Std. Err. P-value
sex -0.169 0.064 0.01 -0.010 0.063 0.87 -0.119 0.063 0.06
age 0.012 0.010 0.23 0.018 0.010 0.07 0.022 0.010 0.02
tenure 0.003 0.002 0.19 0.002 0.002 0.20 0.002 0.002 0.32
b_health -0.275 0.065 0.00 -0.182 0.065 0.01 -0.276 0.064 0.00
school_j 0.048 0.081 0.56 -0.078 0.080 0.33 -0.025 0.080 0.75
school_u -0.056 0.055 0.31 -0.020 0.055 0.71 -0.061 0.055 0.26
m_retire 0.002 0.056 0.97 0.021 0.056 0.71 -0.042 0.055 0.45
same_j -0.107 0.063 0.09 0.016 0.062 0.80 -0.091 0.062 0.14
prof 0.153 0.164 0.35 0.385 0.159 0.02 0.460 0.159 0.00
manage 0.275 0.169 0.10 0.524 0.170 0.00 0.824 0.169 0.00
office 0.391 0.206 0.06 0.598 0.205 0.00 0.595 0.203 0.00
sale 0.215 0.143 0.13 0.647 0.141 0.00 0.646 0.141 0.00
service 0.536 0.199 0.01 0.809 0.196 0.00 0.791 0.195 0.00
maint 0.196 0.104 0.06 0.249 0.104 0.02 0.157 0.102 0.12
trans 0.089 0.116 0.44 0.056 0.115 0.63 0.177 0.114 0.12
commu -0.083 0.091 0.36 -0.079 0.091 0.38 -0.099 0.090 0.27
dig 0.044 0.134 0.74 -0.305 0.134 0.02 -0.080 0.131 0.54
agri 0.311 0.084 0.00 0.315 0.083 0.00 0.276 0.083 0.00
g_scale 0.070 0.089 0.43 0.165 0.088 0.06 0.080 0.088 0.36
m_scale 0.011 0.063 0.86 -0.002 0.062 0.98 0.039 0.062 0.53
h_loan -0.032 0.059 0.59 -0.053 0.059 0.37 -0.008 0.058 0.89
edu_cost -0.138 0.086 0.11 0.027 0.085 0.75 -0.053 0.085 0.53
n_earn 0.041 0.028 0.14 -0.007 0.028 0.80 0.070 0.028 0.01
pension 0.011 0.003 0.00 0.001 0.003 0.84 0.007 0.003 0.03
EPP_d -0.098 0.058 0.09 -0.118 0.057 0.04 -0.111 0.057 0.05
cross_zai 0.031 0.085 0.71 0.019 0.085 0.82 0.087 0.084 0.30
Num. of obs 2350 2359 2360
Log Likelihood -2580 -2622 -2708
Pseudo R2 0.024 0.025 0.032
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